Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart - A Prosecutor\u27s View of Pre-Trial Restraints on the Press by Larson, Milton R. & Murphy, John P.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 26 
Issue 3 Spring 1977 Article 2 
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart - A Prosecutor's View of Pre-
Trial Restraints on the Press 
Milton R. Larson 
John P. Murphy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Milton R. Larson & John P. Murphy, Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart - A Prosecutor's View of Pre-Trial 
Restraints on the Press, 26 DePaul L. Rev. 417 (1977) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol26/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
NEBRASKA PRESS ASSOCIATION V. STUART-
A PROSECUTOR'S VIEW OF PRE-TRIAL
RESTRAINTS ON THE PRESS
Milton R. Larson* and John P. Murphy**
Mr. Larson prosecuted the criminal case which formed the fac-
tual setting for the United States Supreme Court decision in
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart. In this article, the authors
explain the factors which prompted a pre-trial restraining order
on publicity. They discuss the alternatives to prior restraints
authorized by the Court and explain why they would have been
ineffective in this case. Finally, they contend that the Stuart
decision effectively eliminates all "gags" on the press, at least
in coverage of criminal proceedings.
Confusion has plagued the legal community and the media in
recent years concerning the protection to be accorded conflicting
constitutional rights arising in criminal jury trials which stimu-
late unusual public interest and extensive media coverage. The
Sixth Amendment' right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial by
an impartial jury is essential to the fair administration of justice.
The right of the press to be free of "prior restraints ' 2 on publica-
tion of facts surrounding criminal proceedings is the correlating
and opposing freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment.' In
exceptional cases, locale and circumstances may combine with
intense publicity to create an atmosphere potentially destructive
of the impartial and orderly functioning of the criminal justice
system. This results in an open clash of First and Sixth Amend-
ment rights.
In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart' the United States
* Lincoln County Attorney, North Platte, Nebraska; Member Nebraska Bar; A.B.,
Hastings College, Hastings, Neb.; J.D., University of Nebraska Law School.
** Partner, Ruff and Murphy; formerly Lincoln County Deputy Attorney, North Platte,
Nebraska; A.B., St. Louis University; J.D., Creighton University.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed ......
2. See notes 35-47 and accompanying text infra.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech or the press ... .
4. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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Supreme Court considered, for the first time, the propriety of a
judicial order restricting pre-trial publicity of the facts of a
heavily-publicized pending criminal action. Essentially, the
question before the Court was the extent of judicial authority to
limit freedom of the press: may responsible judicial discretion
take the form of "prior restraint" on publication for a limited
period of time? The question was narrowed to encompass only
sensational proceedings in which revelation of facts would present
an imminent threat to the impaneling of a constitutionally ac-
ceptable jury.
In Stuart the Court reversed an order of the Nebraska Supreme
Court limiting pre-trial publicity in a criminal prosecution5 for
the murder of six residents of a small Nebraska village. This
Article will discuss the factual setting of the Stuart decision,
providing a basis for comparison with the leading Sixth Amend-
ment cases which had formed the theoretical platform for the
prosecutor's action in Stuart, and will conclude with an analysis
of the Court's reasoning.
I. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart: THE FACTS
On October 18, 1975, three children and three adults were mur-
dered in the Village of Sutherland, Nebraska. Two of the children
and an elderly woman had been sexually assaulted. It was the
most sensational crime in Nebraska since the 1958 Starkweather
murder case.' Late that night and early the following morning,
dozens of members of both the electronic and print media gath-
ered at the scene of the crime. They included representatives of
all local media, the Omaha World Herald,7 and the national wire
services. A helicopter was sent by a national broadcasting net-
5. State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 236 N.W.2d 794 (1975).
6. Nineteen year old Charles R. Starkweather with his accomplice, fourteen year old
Caril Fugate, were charged with nine murders in Lancaster County, Nebraska. Caril's
mother, stepfather and baby half-sister were the first victims. They killed six other per-
sons in order to acquire money, an additional gun and ammunition, food and automobiles.
Starkweather v. State, 167 Neb. 477, 480-82, 93 N.W.2d 619, 621-22 (1958).
This sensational crime spree still draws the attention of the news media. See To a
Dumpy New Life, TIME, June 21, 1976, at 22 (interview with Caril Fugate upon her parole
from a Nebraska penitentiary).
7. The Omaha World Herald is the only Nebraska paper with a statewide circulation.
Its daily circulation was 235,830 in 1976. The Sunday edition had 278,826 readers.
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work from Denver, Colorado. In this tense atmosphere, some re-
porters demanded access to the scene of the crime; the request
was denied. However, they were told that the preliminary investi-
gation indicated that Erwin Charles Simants was the prime sus-
pect and they were given his description. On October 19, Simants
was arrested by the Lincoln County Sheriff, charged with six
counts of murder in the first degree, and arraigned in the county
court of Lincoln County, Nebraska, in North Platte.'
Meanwhile, media representatives interviewed potential wit-
nesses. On October 20, a local paper of general circulation in the
Lincoln County area dedicated its front page, almost exclusively,
to the gruesome events of the weekend. One story recounted
statements by Simants' father that his son had killed "five or six
people"9 as well as hearsay statements by the Lincoln County
sheriff about Simants' activities after the alleged murders. 0 An-
other story revealed that one of the victims had "saved Simants
from jail" in the past as an act of kindness." On the same day
8. 427 U.S. at 573 (Brennan, J., concurring). The charges were amended later to include
allegations of sexual assault. Id. at 575.
9. The North Platte Telegraph reported:
[Sitanding near the Kellie home Saturday night, the elder Simants tearfully
said, "my son killed five or six people here .
. . .The elder Simants said his son told him of the slayings. Linstrom said
that when his father suggested that he turn himself in, Erwin fled, according to
Linstrom ...
Id. at col. 4.
10. Gilster [the sheriff] said Simants told him that he went to both the
Rodeo and Longhorn Bars in Sutherland after the shootings occurred and or-
dered a beer in each. The patrons didn't know anything about it (the shootings)
at the time.
• . .Glister said Simants later "wandered in the weeds near the scene of the
crime . ... ..
Id. at col. 5, 6.
11. The North Platte Telegraph article stated:
Henery Kellie Saved Erwin Charles Simants from Jail September 29 According
to Friends of Kellie. According to friends, Simants had been fined $50.00 for
public intoxication but was unable to pay the fine. The Rev. Nels Ibsen, Kellie's
pastor, said Kellie paid the fine so he (Simants) didn't have to lay it out in
jail. .. .
."Henery was well liked and it was just his nature to help people," said
his minister. "I don't know if he had ever had paid anyone's fine before, but he
19771
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another local paper carried an account of Simants' purported
confession to his father." On October 21, a Denver, Colorado
paper published reports of Simants' confession to his mother, 3
and a national wire service released a story purporting to be the
Lincoln County Attorney's account of Simants' confession."
The prosecution filed a motion on October 21, requesting the
county court to issue such order as it found necessary to restrict
pre-trial publication of prejudicial facts which might endanger
the impaneling of an impartial jury. 5 Although such requests are
generally made by the defense, the prosecution took affirmative
action because of the duty imposed on all prosecutors, as both
officers of the court and representatives of the state, to maintain
an adversary system which dispenses impartial justice, rather
than one which merely seeks convictions." Inherent in this pur-
suit are the right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial before a
constitutionally acceptable jury and, of equal importance, the
would always shell out money to help in other ways.
.. .Kellie, Ibsen said, had befriended Simants when he had stayed with
Simants' sister, Mrs. William Boggs, next door to the Kellie residence.
Id. at col. 6.
12. Lincoln Star, Oct. 20, 1975, at 1, col. 4.
13. The Denver Post, Oct. 20, 1975, at 1, col. 6. The report appeared under the headline:
Charges Filed in Nebraska Family Death. . .Simants' Mother said her Son Admitted
the Killings to Her and Her Husband, But Police-Baffled By the Incident- Wouldn't
Reveal Whether They Had a Confession.
14. Friendly, Fred W., A Crime and Its AfterShock, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1976, §6
Magazine, at 86.
By 9:00 that morning (October 20, 1975), Simants had been booked, stripped
of his clothing and boots, which would be used as evidence and had listened
three times to Miranda card warnings; that statements that he might make
could be used against him. Now he was making a confession in which he admit-
ted to the murders and sexual assaults . ..this confession was not officially
reported to the media, but thirty minutes later, Prosecutor Larson was quoted
by A.P. as saying "Simants apparently walked to his father's home after the
shootings and told his father he was responsible for the deaths." However, the
A.P. Bureau Chief in Omaha, admits hearsay of the ambulance driver's hus-
band was falsely attributed to Larson.
15. The motion is summarized by Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion. 427 U.S.
at 574.
16. ABA, PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, §1.1(c) (Approved Draft, 1971). The
section provides, "The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict."
See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-103 (explaining the prosecutor's
duty).
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right of society to fair and effective enforcement of its laws. Thus,
when facts arise which might jeopardize a defendant's right to a
fair trial, action must be taken to protect this interest, or else any
conviction obtained might be reversed. 7 Society also suffers a loss
when a reversal is mandated because it is deprived of the efficient
administration of its penal laws. None of these interests should
be jeopardized by improper reporting. Therefore, it seems clear
that the prosecution, independent of any action by the defense,
has the duty to act swiftly to protect the important rights compet-
ing for attention in a criminal proceeding.
When the motion to restrict publicity was filed, an oral request
was made for immediate action because a preliminary hearing on
the murder charges was scheduled for the following morning.'8
The county judge, Ronald A. Ruff, immediately notified the in-
terested media and set the hearing for that same evening. The
prosecution advised the court that testimony concerning Si-
mants' confessions to his nephew, parents, and law enforcement
officials would be offered at the preliminary hearing, along with
testimony of a pathologist about the sexual assault on one of the
child victims. It was feared that publication of such testimony
would be highly prejudicial. The defense joined in the motion to
restrict publication. The court entered a protective order, reject-
ing media contentions that it would be unconstitutional."0 The
order barred the "release for public dissemination in any form or
manner whatsoever [of] any testimony given or evidence ad-
duced during the preliminary hearing."' The county court's order
17. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
18. Two factors prompted the prosecution's request for an immediate restraint. First,
the preliminary hearing was open to the public and press; therefore, the dissemination of
further prejudicial publicity had to be halted before then. Second, the preliminary hearing
could not be continued past Oct. 23 because Nebraska law requires that a preliminary
hearing be held within four days of arrest if the defendant is held without bail, as Simants
was. NEB. REv. STAT. §29-501 (1975) (the statute appears in note 108 infra).
19. Representatives of the following news media were notified by telephone: Nebraska
Press Ass'n, The World Herald Co., The Journal Star, Western Publishing Co., North
Platte Broadcasting, Nebraska Broadcaster's Ass'n, Associated Press, and United Press
International. This is contrary to Justice Brennan's assertion that the press was not
notified of the hearings. 427 U.S. at 575.
20. The county court's order is summarized in 427 U.S. at 575. See also State v. Si-
mants, 194 Neb. 783, 784-85, 236 N.W.2d 794, 797 (1975).
21. See note 20 supra.
1977]
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was challenged at a hearing in the district court of Lincoln
County before Judge Hugh Stuart, who issued an order terminat-
ing the county court order and ruled that pre-trial publicity
should be governed in accordance with the Nebraska Bar-Press
Guidelines.22
The media appealed, first to the Nebraska Supreme Court and
then to Justice Harry A. Blackmun,23 in his capacity as Justice
for the Eighth Circuit. They complained that the Bar-Press
Guidelines were strictly voluntary, never having been intended to
be incorporated into a formal court order and that any judicial
order resulting in a prior restraint was violative of the First
Amendment. Justice Blackmun agreed with the press regarding
the wholesale incorporation of the Nebraska Bar-Press Guide-
lines, finding they were too vague to serve as mandatory restric-
tions.2" However, Justice Blackmun did conclude that all prior
restraints on pre-trial publicity "are not necessarily and in all
cases invalid,"2 5 and refused to stay the entire order. He con-
cluded that facts "strongly implicative"2 of a defendant's guilt
may be restrained from publication by the media prior to trial,
indicating that "a confession or statement against interest is the
paradigm." 7
With Justice Blackmun's comments in mind, the Nebraska
Supreme Court considered the media's petition to modify the
district court's restrictive order. The supreme court's order pro-
hibited pre-trial publication of:
22. The Nebraska Bar-Press Guidelines are set out in Appendix A to Justice Brennan's
opinion. 427 U.S. at 613-17. For a general description of the district court order and the
Guidelines, see 427 U.S. at 542-43 n.1.
23. 423 U.S. at 1327 (1975) (Blackmun, J., in chambers). Justice Blackmun initially
postponed ruling on the application for a stay of the district court order in deference to
the Nebraska Supreme Court, 423 U.S. at 1319. One week later, he declared that the
inaction of the Nebraska Supreme Court had exceeded "tolerable limits," 423 U.S. at
1329, because over four weeks had elapsed since the entry of the district court order.
24. 423 U.S. at 1330-31.
25. Id. at 1332.
26. Id. at 1333.
27. Additional examples given by Justice Blackmun included facts associated with the
circumstances of the defendant's arrest, a previous criminal record, and statements of the
prosecution relating to the guilt of the accused. Id. at 1333.
Thus, Justice Blackmun's order constituted a partial stay of the district court order,
directed at the wholesale incorporation of the Guidelines, the reporting of certain medical
testimony at the preliminary hearing, and facts relating to the alleged sexual assault of
some of the victims. Id. at 1330-32.
[Vol. 26:417
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(1) [c]onfessions or admissions against interest made by the
accused to law enforcement officials; (2) confessions or admis-
sions against interest, [either] oral or written made by the
accused to third parties, [except] . . . statements . . . made
by the accused to [media] representatives ... ; [and] (3)
[olther information strongly implicative of the accused as the
perpetrator of the slayings.Y
On appeal the United States Supreme Court found the restric-
tive order unconstitutional because: (1) although the pre-trial
record provided a basis for the trial judge's conclusion that there
would be intense and pervasive pre-trial publicity, his conclusion
about the impact of such publicity on prospective jurors was, of
necessity, speculative, based on unknown and unknowable fac-
tors;29 (2) neither the state trial judge nor the Nebraska Supreme
Court made express findings that alternative measures would
have failed to protect Simants' rights and further, the record was
lacking in evidence tending to support such a finding;3" (3) the
Court was uncertain that a prior restraint on publication would
have protected the defendant's rights because of the inherent
difficulties in managing and enforcing pre-trial restraining orders
which would be limited by the state court's jurisdictional author-
ity;3' (4) the order was constitutionally defective to the extent it
prohibited the reporting of evidence introduced at the prelimi-
nary hearing, which was held in open court;32 and (5) the prohibi-
tion against publication of information "strongly implicative" of
the accused as the perpetrator of the slayings was deemed too
vague and broad to come within any exception to the prior re-
straint doctrine.33
The Court did not exclude the possibility that a case might
arise justifying a restraint on pre-trial publication .3 However, the
decision, when analyzed in terms of the factual setting and record
before the Court, leads to the conclusion that it would be almost
28. State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 801, 236 N.W.2d 794, 805 (1975).
29. 427 U.S. at 562-63.
30. Id. at 563-65.
31. Id. at 565-67.
32. Id. at 567-68.
33. Id. at 568.
34. Id. at 570.
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impossible for a factual situation to occur which would warrant
a prior restraint.
II. HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE
An understanding of the Court's rationale in Stuart, as well as
the prosecutorial position, requires a brief overview of past deci-
sions suggesting that limitations on First Amendment freedoms
may be proper in some circumstances. These decisions indicate
that First Amendment rights of freedom of the press and of ex-
pression are not absolute, nor of such magnitude to reduce all
other constitutional rights to a subservient position, which was
the contention of the press in Stuart.
The general rule is that there must be no prior restraint on the
press.35 However, in Near v. Minnesota," the Supreme Court spe-
cifically recognized that free speech and freedom of the press to
publish are not absolute rights. Accordingly, exceptions to the
general rule against prior restraints have been sanctioned in the
areas of national security,37 obscenity,38 and against usage of
"insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their very utter-
ance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace."" Similarly, "commercial speech" may be limited by the
35. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
36. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
37. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). The national security exception
articulated in Schenck was most recently reviewed in New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), where seven members of the Court recognized the validity of
the Schenck exception to the presumption against prior restraints. However, the majority
held that the prior restraint against publication there was invalid. The Supreme Court
has clearly asserted in Schenck and in New York Times that the party asking for a prior
restraint must show that there is an extremely high probability that the harm to be
prevented would occur without the prior restraint. In Schenck and New York Times,
however, the harm to be avoided was not the infringement of an individual's Sixth Amend-
ment constitutional right to an impartial jury in a criminal proceeding.
38. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
39. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Freedman and Chaplinsky
may be recognized as legitimate exceptions to the general prohibition against prior re-
straint although they are based under different footing than is the Schenck exception.
What was banned in Chaplinsky and what might have been banned in Freedman had
constitutional procedures been followed, was speech qua speech, although in Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the Supreme Court held that obscenity is not within
the area of constitutionally protected speech or press. The same, of course, holds true for
the "fighting words" prohibited by Chaplinsky.
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legislature without incurring a violation of the prior restraint doc-
trine or the First Amendment." Copyright laws, which authorize
courts to grant injunctions prohibiting the publication of certain
materials, also may be recognized as restrictions involving a
prior restraint on the press." Cases seeking injunctive relief
under copyright law have been frequent in federal courts,'2 and
even the press has not been adverse to prior restraints in these
circumstances. 3 Federal regulatory statutes" in the area of labor
relations have escaped constitutional criticism when cease and
desist orders have been issued, as demonstrated by the Court's
decision in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co." There the Court held
that an employer's First Amendment right to communicate with
its employees could be limited in order to protect the rights of
the employees to associate freely.' 6 Recently, a lower federal
court sustained an injunction prohibiting a Central Intelligence
Agency employee from publishing material in violation of an
agreement against public disclosure of such material without
agency approval. 7
The examples above emphasize that the absolutist view of the
First Amendment cannot be supported in history or in law. How-
ever, they admittedly do not address the specific issue of the
constitutionality of a prior restraint on publication of facts sur-
40. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). For a discussion of recent Supreme
Court decisions concerning the scope of First Amendment protection for commercial
speech, see Note, The Erosion of Commercial Speech-The Right to Know and the
Informed Consumer- Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 26 DEPAUL L. Rav. 134 (1976); Note, Commercial Speech-An End in Sight
to Chrestensen?, 23 DEPAUL L. Rav. 1258 (1974).
41. 17 U.S.C. §101(a) (1970); 28 U.S.C. §1338 (1970) (giving original jurisdiction to
federal district courts to hear copyright infringement suits).
42. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Peters) 591 (1834); American Metropolitan Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 389 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1968); Ideal Toy Corp. v.
Fab Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1966); Houghton Mifflin Co. v. J. Stackpole Sons,
Inc., 104 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1939); Chappell & Co. v. Fields, 210 F. 864 (2nd Cir. 1914).
43. See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
44. National Labor Relations Act, §§8(a)(1), (b)(7), 8 (c), 29 U.S.C. §§151 et seq.
(1970).
45. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
46. Id. at 616-17.
47. Albert A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 908
(1975). See also United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1063 (1973).
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rounding a pending criminal action. The Supreme Court has con-
sidered the problems of prejudicial pre-trial publicity in criminal
cases in several decisions in which post-conviction relief was
sought. However, these cases did not involve the propriety of pre-
trial judicial action to avoid prejudice to a prospective jury. As
noted, Stuart is the first case in which prophylactic action was
reviewed by the Court.
A reading of several post-conviction cases prior to Stuart, in-
cluding Irvin v. Doud,18 Rideau v. Louisiana," Estes v. Texas,5"
and Sheppard v. Maxwell,5' seems to indicate that there is a
burden on the court and the attorneys involved in a case to take
preventive action before trial to insure the constitutional right to
a fair and impartial jury. Without such action, the only relief
comes through a new trial, but the harm to the defendant exposed
to outrageous publicity compounded by a verdict rendered by a
biased jury can never be compensated fully.
Irvin v. Doud2 established that there is an affirmative duty to
take measures to insure a criminal proceeding that is conducted
in an atmosphere hospitable to the fair administration of justice.
This was the first state court conviction to be reversed by the
Court exclusively on the grounds of prejudicial pre-trial publicity.
In an unanimous decision, the Court found the defendant had
been denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment
because he was not tried by an impartial jury. 3 A virtual flood of
48. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
49. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
50. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
51. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
52. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
53. 366 U.S. at 728. The Court further stated:
It is not required, however, that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and
issues involved. . . .To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion
as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut
the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an
impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or
opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. Spies v.
Illinois, 123 U.S. 131; Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245; Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
Id. at 722-73. In Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959), a conviction for unlawful
dispensing of drugs was reversed because jurors were exposed to evidence not admitted
at trial through newspaper accounts of the proceeding. Although the reversal was based
on the supervisory power of the court rather than on constitutional grounds, the case
[Vol. 26:417
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newspaper headlines, articles, cartoons, and pictures was pub-
lished depicting the defendant during the seven months preced-
ing his trial. Newspaper stories revealed he had confessed to six
murders and 24 burglaries for which he had not been charged. Of
the 430 veniremen called, nearly 90 percent had some opinion
about his guilt; eight of the 12 jurors thought he was guilty.54 The
Court explained that the mere existence of a juror's preconceived
opinion about a defendant's guilt or innocence, without more, was
insufficient to raise a presumption against a prospective juror's
impartiality; however, there must be some indication that the
juror can lay aside his opinion and return a verdict based solely
on the evidence presented in court." The assertions of prospective
jurors that they would be fair and impartial were not determina-
tive in this case, Mr. Justice Clark noted, because "where so
many, so many times, admitted prejudice, such a statement of
impartiality can be given little weight.""6 However, in a later
case, Murphy v. Florida,5" the Court found no Fourteenth Amend-
ment violation despite a barrage of newspaper articles and state-
ments by a juror that he was aware of the defendant's prior crimi-
nal record. The distinguishing factor here, the Court indicated,
was that the juror's bias was not considered significant because
it was brought out by "leading and hypothetical questions."58
Pre-trial television broadcasts of statements by defendants
and judicial proceedings have been condemned by the Court
marks the Court's first recognition of the effects of prejudicial pre-trial publicity. The
decision, however, was expressly made inapplicable to the states.
54. 366 U.S. at 727. While eight of the twelve jurors who finally served on the jury
admitted that they thought petitioner was guilty, each indicated that despite his opinion,
he could render an impartial verdict.
55. The Court feared that it would be difficult to determine whether each juror could
exclude this preconception of guilt from his deliberations, and that "the influence that
lurks in an opinion once formed is so persistent that it unconsciously fights detachment
from the mental processes of the average man." Id. The Court also considered the conse-
quences at stake in such a determination, and decided that in light of those circumstances
the finding of impartiality by the lower courts did not meet the constitutional standards.
Id. at 727-28.
56. Id. at 728.
57. 421 U.S. 794 (1975). The case was heavily publicized. The juror stated that he had
knowledge of defendant's prior convictions, and "imagined" that these convictions would
influence his verdict. Certainly when this juror was sworn in he held something less than
a presumption of innocence for the defendant.
58. Id. at 804 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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when they are extensive and tend to create a "carnival atmos-
phere." In Rideau v. Louisiana," a state court conviction for rob-
bery, kidnapping, and murder was reversed. The defendant's
motion for a change of venue had been denied in spite of extensive
television coverage. Two months before trial, the local television
station had broadcast three times within the space of two days a
twenty-minute statement made by the defendant to the parish
sheriff. The defendant admitted that he had committed the
crimes for which he was on trial. The Supreme Court held that
the filmed "interview," seen by thousands of people in the com-
munity in which the defendant was to be tried, was antithetical
to traditional notions of due process. The televised "confession"
was, in effect, a "trial" at which the defendant had pleaded
guilty. The Court found that any further proceedings in that
community would be but a hollow formality." In Estes v. Texas,"'
Justice Clark, writing for the majority, discussed the "carnival
atmosphere" surrounding the now-famous swindling trial of Billy
Sol Estes. The trial court had permitted pre-trial hearings to be
televised, but banned coverage at trial, except for the attorneys'
closing arguments.62 Booths were erected in the rear of the court-
room for cameras to minimize the effects of their presence, but
the cameras remained clearly visible. The Court found that a
two-day pre-trial hearing had been televised in an atmosphere
which lacked the judicial serenity and calm required for the fair
administration of justice. Four of the twelve jurors selected to
hear the case had seen or heard all or part of the broadcasts of
the earlier proceedings. 3 The Court recognized that pre-trial pub-
licity may be more harmful than publicity during the trial be-
cause it may set the community opinion about guilt or inno-
cence.6"
The Estes decision recognized that the press is a mighty cata-
lyst in awakening the public interest in governmental affairs,
exposing governmental corruption, and informing the public of
59. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
60. Id. at 726.
61. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
62. Only the prosecution's arguments were aired as the defense counsel requested not
to be broadcast. Id. at 537.
63. Id. at 551.
64. Id. at 536.
[Vol. 26:417
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important events and occurrences, including judicial proceed-
ings. While this function must be protected, the Court clearly
stated that the press may be subject to limitations needed to
maintain absolute fairness in the administration of justice in a
democratic society. 5
The decisions in Irvin, Rideau, and Estes were confined to a
discussion of errors made in the lower courts; no recommenda-
tions were made about preventive measures which a court might
take to insure a fair trial. However, in Sheppard v. Maxwell" the
Court, in dictum, indicated certain pre-trial steps which could be
taken to prevent or minimize the impact of prejudicial publicity.
The Court pointed out that:
[R]eversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial
measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The
courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will
protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences.
Neither prosecutors, counsel for the defense, the accused, wit-
nesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the
jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its
function. Collaboration between counsel and the press as to in-
formation affecting the fairness of criminal trial is not only sub-
ject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disci-
plinary measures. 7
The preventive measures the Court approved of in Sheppard will
be discussed later in this Article." It is important to note that the
dictum in Sheppard, indicating that restrictive orders may be
proper to insure a fair trial, laid the foundation for a proliferation
of gag orders on both trial participants"9 and the press.70 It is with
this background that the Supreme Court considered the facts in
Stuart.
65. Id. at 539.
66. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
67. Id. at 363 (1966) (emphasis added). The principle focus in Sheppard was the impact
of pre-trial publicity and a trial court's duty to protect the defendant's right to a fair
trial.
68. See notes 74-98 and accompanying text infra.
69. State v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, 483 P.2d 608, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
70. See cases collected in Landau, Fair Trial and Free Press: A Due Process Proposal,
62 A.B.A.J. 55, 57 (1976).
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IIl. AN ANALYSIS
The Court in Stuart observed that none of the prior restraint
cases which had been decided previously involved restrictive or-
ders entered to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial. However,
"the thread running through all previous cases is that prior re-
straints on speech and publication are the most serious and the
least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights."' This
principle has a sound basis in law and in reason. For example, a
criminal penalty or judgment in a defamation case is subject to
a wide range of protections which defer the impact of judgment
until all avenues of appellate review have been exhausted. A prior
restraint, by contrast, has an immediate and irreversible effect.
The Court explained that "if it can be said that a threat of crimi-
nal or civil sanctions after publication 'chills' speech, prior re-
straint 'freezes' it, at least for a time."7 Although the Court ac-
knowledged that the extraordinary protection afforded by the
First Amendment imposes a fiduciary duty to exercise the pro-
tected rights responsibly, it specifically warned that the damage
to First Amendment freedoms can be particularly great where the
prior restraint falls upon communication of news and commen-
tary on current events." An understanding of the Court's findings
in Stuart requires a conscious awareness of the above observa-
tions. The following analysis will be broken into five main parts,
each specifically discussing a major holding of the Court.
A. The Speculative Basis of the Trial Judge's Finding of
Adverse Impact from Pre-trial Publicity
The Court adopted a balancing test to determine the propriety
of a restrictive order, that is, whether "the gravity of the 'evil,'
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."7 This is a broad test
and raises significant doubts whether any prior restraint on publi-
cation will ever be valid.
71. 427 U.S. at 559.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 562, quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 210, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), afl'd,
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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The Court found that the record justified the trial judge's find-
ing that there would be intense, pervasive pre-trial publicity.75
Nevertheless, the conclusion about the impact of such publicity
on prospective jurors had to be speculative, at best, because the
trial judge had to consider unknown and unknowable factors."
Along this line the Court stated:
On the record now before us it is not clear that further publicity,
unchecked, would so distort the views of potential jurors that
twelve could not be found who would, under proper instructions,
fulfill their sworn duties to render a just verdict exclusively on
the evidence presented in open court. . . . Reasonable minds
can have few doubts about the gravity of the evil pre-trial pub-
licity can work, but the probability that it would do so here was
not demonstrated with the degree of certainty our cases on prior
restraints require."
As a practical matter, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in
which the record could reflect satisfactorily, in advance of publi-
cation, that unchecked publicity would so distort the views of the
community that 12 jurors could not be found who would be able
to render a verdict exclusively on evidence presented in open
court.
It is implicit in the Court's finding that there must be a show-
ing of actual prejudice to a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights
in order to validate a prior restraint on publication. However, the
Court did not indicate what kind of evidence would be necessary
to establish the requisite degree of harm to a defendant. Further,
in advance of publication it is impossible to know the tone or
extent of publicity to follow or to predict accurately the future
responsibility or irresponsibility of the media. The need to show
actual prejudice to a defendant's rights is confusing in light of the
holdings in Estes,78 Rideau,7 and Turner v. Louisiana," all of
75. 427 U.S. at 562-63.
76. Id. at 563.
77. Id. at 569 (emphasis added).
78. 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1965). The Court found that televising a criminal trial inher-
ently interfered with the defendant's due process rights.
79. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963). The Court held that televising a defen-
dant's confession was violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
even without a showing of prejudice or a demonstration of the nexus between the televised
confession and the trial.
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which indicated that such a showing was not essential. In Estes,
for example, the publicity and events surrounding the trial were
sufficient to create a probability of prejudice to the defendant. As
the Court stated there:
[Tihis Court itself has found instances in which a showing of
actual prejudice is not a prerequisite to reversal. This is such a
case. It is true that in most cases involving claims of due process
deprivations we require a showing of identifiable prejudice to
the accused. Nevertheless, at times a procedure employed by
the State involves such a probability that prejudice will result
that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process."
The facts in Rideau are the most analogous to those in Stuart.
The televised confession in Rideau was seen in the community in
which the trial ultimately was held. Simants, the defendant in
Stuart, had confessed to his nephew and his parents, and had
given a tape recorded confession to law enforcement officials. He
was arrested on a Saturday and on the following Monday, all
three confessions were publicized widely. The community in
which Rideau was tried had a population of approximately
150,000 residents,8 2 of whom an estimated 106,000 had witnessed
the televised confession. Lincoln County, in which Simants was
tried, has a population of approximately 30,000 residents, approx-
imately 20,000 of whom reside in North Platte,83 where there was
extensive reporting of Simants' confessions. Rideau's conviction
was reversed because of extensive exposure of the community to
the spectacle of the defendant personally confessing, in detail, to
the crimes with which he was charged. In the Stuart case, in-
80. 379 U.S. 466, 473 (1965). In Turner, a murder conviction was reversed where two
deputy sheriffs who were the principal prosecution witnesses also served as bailiffs during
a three-day murder trial. This duty resulted in their continuous and intimate association
with the jurors. No prejudice was shown, but the circumstances were held to be inherently
suspect, and therefore, a showing of actual prejudice was not required to gain a reversal.
The Court was unimpressed with the testimony that the deputies had not discussed the
case directly with any members of the jury, recognizing the extreme prejudice inherent in
the continuous association throughout the trial between the jurors and the prosecution's
key witnesses.
81. 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1965).
82. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. at 724 (population of Calcasieu Parish, La.).
83. The 1976 populations for North Platte and Lincoln County were probably slightly
larger. These figures appear in BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COUNTY
AND Crry DATA BOOK, Table 2 at 312 (1972).
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depth exposure of the community to confessions of the defendant
was forestalled by the restrictive order, limited in scope and dura-
tion to pre-trial proceedings. Without the restrictive order in
Stuart, the likelihood of the prejudice which occurred in Rideau
was high.
The trial court was acutely aware of the situation concerning
publicity, reactions of the community and the gravity and brutal-
ity of the crime at the time it issued the restrictive order. It
should be reiterated that this crime involved the mass murder of
a family of six and was the most sensational crime in Nebraska
since the Starkweather murders of 1958. If the factual circum-
stances surrounding the Stuart decision did not attain the requi-
site level of objective proof to justify a necessarily subjective find-
ing that publication of such facts would have created an atmos-
phere inherently lacking in due process, the constitutionality of
such an order under any circumstance is seriously in question.
B. The State Court's Failure to Determine Whether There Were
Alternatives to Prior Restraint
The Court specifically criticized both the state trial court and
state supreme court orders for their failure to expressly indicate
whether measures short of prior restraint were available to pro-
tect the defendant's rights. 4 The Court, however, did concede
that the entry of such orders might be read as a judicial determi-
nation that there was no feasible alternative course of action."
However, the Court went on to cite approvingly the alternatives
to prior restraint discussed in Sheppard. The heavy reliance
placed on these alternatives leads to the conclusion that the
Court deems them adequate for nearly all conceivable situa-
tions.81 The suggested alternatives include: (1) continuance of the
trial date; (2) change of venue; (3) admonishments to the jury;
(4) extensive voir dire of prospective jurors; (5) reversals; and (6)
new trials.87 Let us examine these alternatives as they relate to
the factual circumstances before the court in Stuart.
84. 427 U.S. at 565.
85. Id. at 563.
86. Id. at 555.
87. Id. at 563-64.
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The suggestion of a continuance of the trial date fails to ac-
knowledge a criminal defendant's constitutional right to a speedy
trial or the prosecution's statutory obligation to bring the matter
to trial within six months." Nebraska law requires that a criminal
trial be given preference over civil cases, and that the trial of a
defendant who is in custody and whose pre-trial liberty reasona-
bly is thought to present an unusual risk must be given preference
over other criminal cases.89 The defendant Simants was held
without bail. Recognizing these constitutional and statutory obli-
gations, the trial judge set an early trial date. In view of the great
interest expressed in this case both regionally and nationally, it
is unlikely that the adverse effect of pre-trial publicity could have
been substantially reduced by a continuance in Simants' case.
A logical question is whether the mere passage of time until
trial would have destroyed much of the prejudicial effect of pre-
trial publicity, even in the absence of a continuance. A cursory
review of local news coverage reveals that scarcely a single day
passed between the occurrence of the crime and the conclusion
of the trial in which there was not a report of the progress of the
action in the local newspaper, the North Platte Telegraph. The
crime, certainly newsworthy and publicized each day, did not
lessen in importance as time went by but rather became of greater
importance to the community. This observation is in retrospect
and was not part of the record before the Supreme Court in
Stuart. However, it was the anticipation of such continuing sub-
stantial publicity that formed the trial court's subjective basis for
the issuance of the order in question.
Instructions to the jury to disregard prejudicial information
which had come to them from outside sources is another alterna-
tive suggested in Sheppard. The Court previously has held that
the circumstances surrounding a criminal trial can give rise to
such a prejudical atmosphere that due process is inherently lack-
ing.9 0 No matter how hard a juror tries consciously to set aside an
opinion which he has formed, subconscious impartiality may be
impossible. Instructions are effective only if given to a jury which
88. NEB. REV. STAT. §29-1207 (1975).
89. NEB. REV. STAT. §29-1205 (1975).
90. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965);
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Doud, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
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was not impaneled with an established pre-disposition toward
guilt or innocence. Again, the pervasive and extensive informa-
tion in Stuart already had been published at the time of the
issuance of the disputed order. These publications gave rise to the
trial courts subjective determination that, if such publicity con-
tinued, there would have been an imminent threat to the impa-
neling of an impartial jury.
Extensive voir dire examination to determine prejudice and to
eliminate veniremen who held an established opinion about a
criminal defendant also would appear to have been an ineffective
alternative. As the Supreme Court has noted, an entire com-
munity can be fatally infected from extensive prejudicial public-
ity' or from circumstances such as those in Rideau.2 Moreover,
Irvin, Turner, Rideau, and Estes recognize that what a juror says
on voir dire does not insure impartiality. Finally, it is apparent
that the more often a potential juror is asked whether he has
heard of confessions, statements, or accounts of the defendant's
prior criminal record, the more the existence of this prejudicial
information is driven home. If the attorneys are less direct in their
examination of potential jurors, they may not uncover an existing
bias.93
In a study involving experimental juries hearing actual cases,
Professors Padawer-Singer and Barton found that jurors exposed
to prejudicial coverage "were as much as 66 [percent] more
likely to find defendants 'guilty' than jurors who had read
'straight' news reporting." 4 The preliminary study also found
91. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Irvin v. Doud, 366 U.S. 717 (i961).
92. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963). However, in Stroble v. California, 343
U.S. 181 (1952), the Supreme Court affirmed a conviction and death sentence challenged
on the ground that pre-trial news accounts, including the prosecutor's release of the
defendant's recorded confession, were allegedly so inflammatory as to amount to a denial
of due process. The Court disapproved of the prosecutor's conduct but noted that the
publicity had receded some six weeks before trial, that the defendant had not moved for
a change of venue, and that the confession had been found voluntary and admitted in
evidence at the trial. The Court also noted the thorough examination of jurors on voir dire
and the careful review of the facts by the state courts, and held that the petitioner had
failed to demonstrate a denial of due process. 427 U.S. at 554.
93. See Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 So. CAL. L. REv. 503
(1965).
94. Padawer-Singer & Barton, The Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Juror's Verdicts, in
THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 123-39 (R.J. Simon ed. 1975).
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that thorough voir dire examination reduced this figure but did
not eliminate it.95 Additional problems may arise in ferreting out
bias in jurisdictions which do not allow attorneys to question
jurors on voir dire. The trial judge conducting the voir dire cannot
raise all the possible questions which counsel would raise. This
possibility reduces the effectiveness of this method.
The suggested alternatives of reversals or new trials cannot be
considered as viable alternatives to a trial judge. They exist only
to insure that the pre-trial publicity was not unduly prejudicial
to a criminal defendant. As noted in Sheppard, "we must remem-
ber that reversals are but palliatives; and the cure lies in those
remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its incep-
tion."9 The supposed remedies of sequestration of witnesses and
juries, and admonitions to disregard media coverage are directed
to the conduct of the trial itself and can have no effect on prejudi-
cial pre-trial publicity.
The suggested alternative which most probably could have
been used in Simants' case in lieu of a prior restraint on publica-
tion was a change of venue. Although Nebraska law97 permits
change of venue in criminal cases only to a county adjoining the
county in which the crime was committed, the Supreme Court in
Stuart pointed out that they have held that state laws restricting
venue must on occasion yield to the constitutional requirement
that a state afford a fair trial.9 At the time the restrictive order
was entered a change of venue was not available to the trial court
as a practical matter, in light of existing state laws limiting a
95. Id.
96. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
97. NEB. REv. STAT. §29-1301 (1975). The Nebraska statute provides:
All criminal cases shall be tried in the county where the offense was committed,
except as otherwise provided in sections 29-1301.01 to 29-1301.03 or section 24-
903, or unless it shall appear to the court by affidavits that a fair and impartial
trial cannot be had therein. In such a case the court may direct the person
accused to be tried in some adjoining county.
98. 427 U.S. at 563 n.7, citing Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971). The Court
observed that the combined population of Lincoln County and adjacent counties to which
a change of venue could be had, is over 80,000 and suggested that there was a substantial
pool of prospective jurors. This observation is incorrect. The pool of prospective jurors is
no larger than the number of people living in the county in which the trial is to be held.
For example, if a trial is held in Lincoln County the total number of prospective jurors is
30,000. If a trial is had in Arthur County, which is an adjoining county to Lincoln County,
the total pool of prospective jurors is 600, the population of Arthur County.
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change of venue to an adjoining county. All the counties sur-
rounding Lincoln County are smaller and are served by the same
television and radio stations and the same newspaper. Thus, all
adjoining counties were subject to the same prejudicial publicity.
It also should be noted that one of the parties in Stuart was the
Omaha World Herald which has a statewide circulation. The pre-
trial publicity was not localized in Lincoln County and the sur-
rounding area but pervaded the entire state.
C. Practical Limitations on the Effectiveness of Any Pre-trial
Restraining Order
The Court took a hard look at the practical effectiveness of a
restraining order and concluded that there were three major ob-
stacles in the Stuart case. The first was the limited jurisdictional
power of the trial court. It would be difficult, if not impossible,
to have in personam jurisdiction over all the media involved in
the case. Second, the court expressed concern about the drafting
of such an order to cover all the information which might affect
potential jurors. It would be impossible to predict accurately the
kind of information which would have an adverse impact and so
any order would necessarily be deficient in offering protection to
a defendant's rights. Finally, the Court seemed to feel that the
restrictive order would be of little real value because of the fact
that the crime occurred in a small community in which rumors
travel by word of mouth.
The jurisdictional problems in enforcing a prior restraint on
publication were underscored in Stuart.9 The trial court order
applied to publication at large as distinguished from restraining
publication by named individuals within the trial court's jurisdic-
tion. This difficulty was acknowledged by the Nebraska Supreme
Court which decided that the state court had no jurisdiction over
the media except through their voluntary submission to the
court's power when they intervened in the action. Except for the
intervention the Nebraska Supreme Court conceded the petition-
ers "could have ignored the order."'00
99. Id. at 565-66.
100. State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 795, 236 N.W.2d 802 t1975).
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Certainly the concept of an order directed at large rather than
at named parties is foreign to our concept of jurisprudence. How-
ever, it would not seem, at least at first glance, that in personam
jurisdiction would normally present a practical problem, even in
sensational cases.
The danger to a fair trial presented by pre-trial publicity is
directly related to the tone of the publicity, the extent or repeti-
tion of the publicity, and the proximity of the publicity to time
of trial. Those most interested in the circumstances of even a
sensational trial will be local media. In the normal course, a trial
judge may obtain personal jurisdiction over local print and elec-
tronic media. National coverage by major networks or newspa-
pers is generally of limited duration except in extremely rare
cases which provoke a continuing nationwide interest and con-
cern. This was not the case in the murder of a rural family by an
unknown defendant. Wire stories available to the local media
from outside sources need not be printed if they violate a specific
court order. Therefore it would seem, at least in sensational cases
of primarily local interest, courts generally would have jurisdic-
tion over those parties most likely to be responsible for dissemi-
nating prejudicial facts to potential jurors on a continuing
basis.'0' It was, in fact, lack of control over local media that re-
sulted in the reversals in Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard.
The Court suggested that the effect of rumor in the small rural
community in which the crime occurred could "well be more
damaging than reasonably accurate news accounts." 02 The Court
was unimpressed with the state's argument that less credence is
given by the average person to "back door" gossip than is given
to media accounts of events transpiring in court. Is it not more
plausible that a potential juror will be able to set aside a precon-
ceived bias based on hearsay and rumor acquired from a neighbor
than newspaper revelations of a confession admitted into evi-
101. Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). Local media may be subject to in personam
jurisdiction of a state court because of their actual presence within the borders of the state.
Thus, under the facts in Stuart, the local newspapers in North Platte, Lincoln, and the
Omaha World Herald would have been within the territorial jurisdiction of the Lincoln
County court. Because the local media have the greatest continuing interest and influence
in reporting a local news story, prejudicial publicity could be effectively controlled at this
level.
102. 427 U.S. at 567.
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dence for the purpose of establishing probable cause at a prelimi-
nary hearing? The problem is magnified if a confession or admis-
sion, though reported, is inadmissible into evidence at trial be-
cause it was unconstitutionally obtained.
The strongest point made by the Court in Stuart is the inherent
difficulty faced by the trial judge in predicting what information
will in fact undermine the impartiality of jurors. However, Justice
Blackmun, in granting a partial stay of the trial court order,
concluded that, in appropriate circumstances, certain facts
"strongly implicative" of an accused may be restrained from pub-
lication prior to trial, noting that "a confession or statement
against interest is the paradigm."'' 3 He cited as examples of
highly prejudicial facts, those associated with the circumstances
of the accused's arrest, facts associated with the accused's crimi-
nal record, and certain statements about the accused's guilt by
those associated with the prosecution.' Those facts deemed
highly prejudicial must, of necessity, be determined on a case by
case basis. Any effort to adopt standards applicable to all con-
ceivable situations would fall short of the mark.
D. A Court May Not Prevent the Press from Attending and
Reporting on Public Trials
The Nebraska order barred the media from reporting about
evidence which had been presented during a preliminary hearing
to determine probable cause. The Court found that this portion
of the order violated the well-established principle that "there is
nothing that proscribes the press from reporting events that tran-
spire in the courtroom."' 15 This is an affirmation of the long
standing American tradition that "what transpires in the court-
room is public property."'
The prosecution was faced with several conflicting duties at the
time of the preliminary hearing. On one hand, the press had to
103. 423 U.S. at 1333 (Blackmun, J., in Chambers).
104. See note 27 supra.
105. 427 U.S. at 568, quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 362-63 (1966).
106. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469 (1975); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532 (1965); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); Penhekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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be allowed to attend the hearing under existing Nebraska law,
which makes all judicial proceedings open to the public. 107 How-
ever, the only evidence available to establish probable cause was
Simants' confessions to his nephew, his parents, and law enforce-
ment officials. This problem arose because of the Nebraska rule
that a defendant held without bond, as Simants was, must be
granted a preliminary hearing within four days of his arrest.,"8 At
the time of the hearing, all other physical evidence was being
prepared for shipment to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Laboratory in Washington, D.C. for analysis. It was feared that
continued news reports about the confessions would only exacer-
bate the difficulty in protecting the defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment rights.
The prosecution was also mindful of the rules established by
Jackson v. Denno'0° which grant a defendant a right to a prelimi-
nary hearing to determine the voluntariness of a confession. Vol-
untariness is a question of law for the court, not of fact for the
jury. Therefore, Jackson requires that this issue be resolved out-
side the presence of the jury to avoid possible prejudice." 0 This
goal could not be achieved if the confessions were published
again, but this time as part of a judicial proceeding. While it is
107. NEB. CONST. art I, §13 provides, "Justice administered without delay. All courts
shall be open, and every person, for any injury done him in his lands, goods, person or
reputation, shall have a remedy by due course of law, and justice administered without
denial or delay."
108. NEB. REV. STAT. §29-501 (1975) provides:
Examination before magistrate; adjournment; period; prisoner; how sustained
and kept. If it shall become necessary for any just cause to adjourn the examina-
tion of any person brought before the magistrate as set forth in sections 29-401
to 29-414, it shall be lawful for such magistrate to adjourn such examination and
commit such person, from time to time, for safekeeping to the jail of the county
until the cause of delay is removed, and no longer; Provided, the whole time of
such confinement in the jail shall not exceed four days; provided, further, the
officer having in custody any such person may by written order of the magis-
trate, detain such person in custody in some secure and convenient place other
than the jail, to be designated by the magistrate in his order, not exceeding four
days; and it shall be the duty of the officer in whose custody any person shall
be detained as above, to provide for the sustenance of such prisoner while in
custody.
109. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
110. "IThe issue of his confession should not have been decided by the convicting jury
but should have been determined in a proceeding separate and apart from the body trying
guilt or innocence." Id. at 394.
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true that Simants' confessions already had been published before
the restrictive order was entered, it was felt that the order could
lessen the impact.
It has been suggested that the defendant should have waived
his right to a preliminary hearing. However, had he done so, he
also might have waived his right to appeal the probable cause
finding for his arrest and detention. Both the defendant and the
prosecution would have been placed in untenable positions had
there been no order restricting prejudicial coverage. The defen-
dant would have had to choose whether to protect his record for
appeal. The prosecution would have had to choose between the
possibility of not presenting sufficient evidence to insure a proba-
ble cause finding or the possibility of paving the way for a reversal
due to prejudicial pre-trial publicity because of the introduction
of the confessions. Thus, in Simants' case, without a restrictive
order the right of the criminal defendant to a preliminary hearing
and the right of the state to effective enforcement of its laws
would have been impaired by prejudicial coverage of the pre-trial
proceedings.
As indicated previously, an absolutist position concerning the
First Amendment guarantee of the press has never been accepted.
The press exists to provide the widest dissemination of informa-
tion possible to the public. In this respect, the press as an institu-
tion is protected by the First Amendment. This institution, how-
ever, exists to serve the people. Service requires responsibility,
and publication of information that may have the effect of so
influencing the fair administration of justice that a guilty man
would go free, denies that responsibility.
The Court takes no position on the closing of a pre-trial pro-
ceeding with the defendant's consent."' The alternative of closing
pre-trial proceedings has been recommended by the American
Bar Association Standards Relating to the Administration of
Criminal Justice."' It would be far more consistent with the pub-
111. This issue might have been resolved in a case which was pending before the Su-
preme Court at the same time as Stuart. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d
242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Cunningham v. Chicago Council of Lawyers,
427 U.S. 912 (1976).
112. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREg PRESS (Approved Draft) (Mar.
1968).
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lic's "right to know" and the justifiable concerns of the press
regarding closed judicial proceedings, that members of the press
be permitted to attend the proceedings, even if immediate cover-
age is proscribed, than to be excluded entirely from the proceed-
ings. Nevertheless, closed proceedings may be a viable constitu-
tional alternative to prior restraint on publication.
The closing of a preliminary hearing to the public seems analo-
gous to proceedings brought before a grand jury. There is no
question that the press is barred from grand jury proceedings,
which are similar to a preliminary hearing in Nebraska. Both
require a showing by the prosecution that there is probable cause
to believe that an individual has committed a crime. The primary
difference is that in the grand jury proceeding evidence is pre-
sented to jurors and in the preliminary hearing the evidence is
presented to a judge.
It is apparent that judicial efforts to protect defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial which infringe upon First Amend-
ment freedoms must follow the least restrictive course. Therefore,
as closure of hearings is most restrictive of First Amendment
freedoms in denying access to the judicial process, it must be the
last alternative utilized.
E. Vagueness of the "Strongly Implicative" Standard
The final holding of the Court was that the Nebraska Supreme
Court's order restraining publication of facts "strongly implica-
tive" of the guilt of the accused was too vague and too broad to
survive the scrutiny given to prior restraints on First Amendment
rights."' It is plain that, absent a more specific definition of the
"strongly implicative" standard, courts cannot determine what
information might be restrained from immediate publication.
Moreover, if a reporter bears the risk of being held in contempt
of court for publishing certain information, he is entitled to know
in advance what information he is proscribed from reporting.
Therefore, the Supreme Court justifiably refused to adopt an
imprecise standard governing prior restraints.
Nevertheless, the Court could have upheld the Nebraska Su-
113. 427 U.S. at 568.
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preme Court order insofar as it restrained the immediate publica-
tion of explicit facts and information given by the accused to
third parties, prior to his arrest and preliminary hearing. For
example, both the Nebraska Supreme Court and Justice Black-
mun forbade the publication of Simants' confessions to his rela-
tives and other statements against interest made by him to the
sheriff. These statements are examples of third party confessions
and hearsay declarations that can be readily discerned by courts
and reporters alike. Had the Supreme Court considered the right
of the criminally accused to an impartial jury at least as urgent
as the right of the press to be free of prior restraint, the Court
might have upheld short-term suppression of the accused's con-
fessions and hearsay declarations against interest. When Justice
Blackmun balanced these absolute rights he recognized that pos-
sibly a very specific standard could pass constitutional muster.
By failing to defend the standard posed in his own partial stay,
Justice Blackmun now indicates that, like most of the Court, he
will not permit a prior restraint under any circumstances.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has held consistently that there is an over-
whelming presumption against prior restraints on publication
and broadcast. This presumption was reaffirmed strongly in
Stuart. In fact, it may be said that this decision has constructed
a barrier so high that it is tantamount to an irrebuttable pre-
sumption against judicial imposition of restraints on pre-trial
publicity. While the Court did not rule out the possibility that
facts might arise in which restraints are necessary,"' it seems that
the only conceivable situation to warrant such action would be a
presidential assassination."' The primary obstacle is that any
judicial order entered in advance of publication must be specula-
tive, dealing with factors which are unknown and unknow-
114. Id. at 569-70.
115. The issue was raised by the Warren Commission Report in relation to its investiga-
tion of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. See id. at 549 n.3. It should be
noted, however, that the strong interest of the public to be informed of facts surrounding
the killing of a national leader might readily outweigh the need to suppress the accused's
self-incriminating statements.
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able-the real impact of pre-trial publicity. In this regard the
Court stated:
Of necessity our holding is confined to the record before us. But
our conclusion is not simply a result of assessing the adequacy
of the showing made in this case; it results in part from the
problems inherent in meeting the heavy burden of demonstrat-
ing, in advance of trial, that without prior restraint a fair trial
will be denied. The practical problems of managing and enforc-
ing restriective orders will always be present. In this sense, the
record now before us is illustrative rather than exceptional.",
The Court's meaning should be unmistakable. With the possible
exception stated above, no conceivable circumstance would af-
ford an opportunity to make a record in advance of publication
as to the ultimate effect of such publication on potential jurors.
The Court requires a finding that it would be impossible to find
twelve constitutionally acceptable unbiased, indifferent jurors. A
factual record cannot be established regarding the effect of future
events to the extent necessary to establish "actual" prejudice to
the fair administration of justice in advance of improper conduct.
The Court relies heavily upon alternatives suggested in
Sheppard and added to those alternatives the possibility of closed
pre-trial hearings. The latter would result in a much greater
"chilling" effect on First Amendment freedoms than an order
limited in scope and duration, restricting publication of specific
facts, the news-worthiness of which would be as great when re-
vealed at trial as at the time of pre-trial proceedings.
The concurring opinions of the Court give additional credence
to the position that a prior restraint on publication of facts sur-
rounding a pending criminal controversy is per se unconstitu-
tional. Mr. Justice White in his separate opinion states that "for
the reasons which the Court itself canvasses there is a grave doubt
in my mind whether orders with respect to the press such as
rendered in this case would ever be justifiable.""' 7 Mr. Justice
Brennan, in an opinion joined by Mr. Justices Stewart and Mar-
shall, took the position that prior restraints on publication and
broadcast are in fact constitutionally impermissible.18 In the
116. Id. at 569.
117. Id. at 570-71.
118. Id. at 572.
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opinion of these Justices, a trial judge has at his command suffi-
cient alternatives to prior restraints to insure that fundamental
fairness is accorded the accused." Mr. Justice Stevens, in his
concurring opinion, agreed with Mr. Justice Brennan, although
he suggested the need to hear arguments on:
[w]hether the same absolute protection would apply no matter
how shabby or illegal the means by which the information is
obtained, no matter how serious an intrusion on privacy might
be involved, no matter how demonstrably false the information
might be, no matter how prejudicial it might be to the interests
of innocent persons, and no matter how perverse the motivation
for publishing it .... 120
Of all the concurring opinions written, only Mr. Justice Powell
conceded that a prior restraint properly might be applied, and
then only upon a showing that it was necessary "to prevent the
dissemination of prejudicial publicity that otherwise poses a high
likelihood of preventing, directly and irreparably, the impaneling
of a jury meeting the Sixth Amendment requirement of impar-
tiality."'' Even though the contents of the defendant's confession
had been published prior to the institution of the court order in
Stuart, Mr. Justice Powell found "beyond question that the prior
restraint here was impermissible." '122
The lesson to be learned from Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart is simple if not as direct as it might have been. There are
virtually no circumstances under which an adequate record could
be prepared to justify the imposition of restraints on publication
and broadcast prior to dissemination.
For members of the media the lesson of Stuart is contained in
a single paragraph:
The extraordinary protections afforded by the First Amendment
carry with them something in the nature of a fiduciary duty to
exercise the protected rights responsibly - a duty widely ac-
knowledged but not always observed by editors and publishers.
It is not asking too much to suggest that those who exercise First
119. Id. at 572-73.
120. Id. at 617.
121. Id. at 571.
122. Id. at 572.
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Amendment rights in newspapers or broadcasting enterprises
direct some effort to protect the rights of an accused to a fair
trial by unbiased jurors.'23
Whether one agrees with the Court, it is obvious that a recal-
citrant press can be dealt with only after the fact. It is clear that
no matter how vile, worthless, or prejudicial the publicity is, no
direct sanctions against the press may be had. The rights of the
accused and the rights of the state must be protected by other
methods including reversals, if necessary. This may be a heavy
price to pay, but it is clear from the Court's opinion that this is a
price which must be paid for living in a free society.
123. Id. at 560.
